Redstone Government Consulting Blog | Michael Steen (4)

Although there is a “time to every purpose under heaven” (lyrics to the song Turn, Turn, Turn, by the Byrds) including a time and purpose for Cost-Type Contracts (FAR 16.3 Cost-Reimbursement Contracts), do not try to sing this song to Senator John McCain (Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee or SASC). In application to cost-reimbursement contracts, Senator McCain recently referred to cost-plus contracting as “an evil that has grown and grown and grown over the years, and I will not stand for it on any weapons system”.   In support of his statement, there is a long history of significant cost overruns on major weapons systems which all started with cost-reimbursable developmental contracts. Unfortunately, comparing original cost estimates with final program costs, i.e., computing the percentage of cost growth, is a very simplistic and incomplete statistic noting that developmental contracts are just that, conceptual and lacking anything approaching a well-defined statement-of-work. As such, these agreements are not exactly candidates for a firm-fixed price contract (FAR 16.2), unless the prime contractor is naïve and/or reasonably sure that its risk will be mitigated by an endless series of change orders and requests for equitable adjustment for each and every change to the statement of work.   As a point of reference explaining why a contractor should not be overly optimistic in terms of accepting a fixed-price contract with an ill-defined statement of work, one only needs to read the decision in US CoFC Nos. 13-55C, 13-97C, filed August 18, 2015.  In particular, the judge rejected the contractor claim for increased costs noting that the contractor voluntarily assumed the risk of a firm-fixed price contract, albeit with an “unusually high risk” attributed to the ill-defined statement of work.

Although FAR 42.202(e)(2) states that prime contractors are responsible for managing subcontracts, DCAA has launched or relaunched a strategy which presumes that prime contractors are responsible for “auditing” subcontractors.   Unfortunately, DCMA seems to have embraced this concept with respect to closing out cost-type subcontracts. Specifically DCMA Instruction 135, section 3.2.3.2 states that prime contractors are responsible for auditing subcontracts and closing subcontract using procedures similar to those used by the government.

2016 NDAA (National Defense Authorization Act)

As reported in our December 3, 2015 blog,2016 Defense Authorization Act Section 893, the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) includes a requirement, ostensibly for improved DCAA auditing, but more narrowly focused on the so-called incurred cost audit backlog (contractor indirect cost rate proposals (ICPs), submitted annually as required by FAR 52.216-7(d)).   Section 893 prohibits DCAA from providing “audit support” for non-defense agencies (e.g. NASA) unless DOD certifies that DCAA is current on the ICP backlog.  “Current” is defined as 18 months of incurred cost inventory, further defined as “the level of contractor incurred cost proposals in inventory from prior years that are currently being audited by DCAA”. 

Requirement for Improved Auditing of Contracts

In late November, President Obama signed the 2016 NDAA (National Defense Authorization Act, S.1356)) which includes a number of sections related to Acquisition Policy or Acquisition Management.  Of particular note for those subject to DCAA contract audits, a requirement for improved auditing which is focused on the so-called incurred cost audit backlog (contractor indirect cost rate proposals (ICPs), submitted annually as required by FAR 52.216-7(d)).   Section 893 prohibits DCAA from performing any audits for non-defense agencies (e.g. NASA) unless DOD certifies that DCAA is current on the ICP backlog.  “Current” is defined as 18 months of incurred cost inventory, further defined as “the level of contractor incurred cost proposals in inventory from prior years that are currently being audited by DCAA”.  As a point of clarification, the inventory should include ICPs currently being audited or those in the queue awaiting audit.  Based upon DCAA’s 2014 report to Congress, DCAA had approximately 18,185 ICPs valued at $822 billion (on hand as of 9/30/2014).  Based upon May 2015 public comments made by DCAA’s Deputy Director, the annual inventory is approximately 7,500 ICPs which would implicate an approximate annual value of $339 billion.

As we approach Halloween and the night of tricks or treats, we’ve done some exhaustive research (more accurately hypothesizing) as to the trending costumes (favored by DCAA or DCMA). Some of the favorites:

As a follow-up to our June 2015 blog on the now really infamous OPM computer hack of 2015 (which might actually date back to 2013 based upon the fact that OPM’s story continually changes) we now know that approximately 21 million personnel records have been compromised.  However, we can all sleep better at night knowing that the action was technically not a cyber-attack because there was purportedly no attempt to take over the systems; hence, “merely” infiltrating (hacking) the systems to gain access to sensitive data including that related to background investigation.

In an Executive Orders (EO) issued on Labor Day, President Obama continued to display his willingness to manage the personnel policies of government contractors. This latest EO, one of many directed solely at Government contractors, will require contractors to provide up to seven days paid sick leave (annually) for employees. The EO comes with the typical unsupported rhetoric that “we’ve seen that many companies, including small businesses, support these policies because they understand it’s helpful with recruitment and retention” and a separate assertion “that paid sick leave will improve contractor performance”. Perhaps unintended, but it is noteworthy that the White House did not state that many companies support the notion that paid sick leave will “improve contractor performance”; by implication, the White House could not find any companies which were sufficiently naive to buy-in to that highly speculative and wholly unsupported assertion.

In 2014 DCAA quietly rolled out its new audit report format which generated some obvious questions:

In more than a few instances, government contractors receive a DCAA inquiry which is not directly related to any particular audit. In many cases, the request involves a Contractor Survey (or a Contractor Internal Control Questionnaire) which is requested annually to facilitate DCAA’s audit planning (at least for the moment given DCAA’s propensity to routinely change audit priorities).   For repetitive annual requests which are essentially the same set of questions received every October as DCAA begins its new fiscal year, the tendency is to complete the questionnaire without asking DCAA to explain what contractual clause requires this action (don’t ask, there is none).

In compliance with 41 U.S.C 1908, adjustments were made to statutory (and non-statutory) acquisition thresholds to accommodate inflation, using the Consumer Price Index. Government Contractors should take note of the threshold changes and be prepared to accommodate the revised thresholds beginning in October 2015 by make the appropriate adjustments to respective policies, procedures, and practices.